The discouragement effect of being the lagging player in multi-stage contests is a welldocumented phenomenon. In this study, we utilize data from 2,447 Davis Cup matches in team tennis tournaments to test the effect of being behind or ahead on individuals' performance with and without intermediate prizes. Using several different strategies to disentangle the effect of being ahead in the interim score from the effect of selection, we find the usual discouragement effect. In other words, a higher ranked player (the favorite) is less likely to win if his team was lagging before the decisive match than when his team was leading. However, in decisive matches in which a winner received an intermediate prize in the form of ranking points, the discouragement effect disappears. The lagging favorite had close to a 20-percentage point higher probability of winning compared to matches without such a prize. We show that this result is not driven by the selection of better players into tournaments with intermediate prizes. As predicted by previous theoretical studies, our empirical findings suggest that intermediate prizes may mitigate or even eliminate the ahead-behind effects that arise in multi-stage contests.
Introduction
One of the fundamental relationships in the economic environment in general and in tournament settings in particular is the relationship between incentives and performance. It has been well-documented that higher stakes enhance the performance of higher ability agents (Rosen, 1986; Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Lazear, 2000; González-Díaz, Gossner and Rogers, 2012; Jetter and Walker, 2015) . Another important feature that is frequently found in multi-stage tournaments is the ahead-behind asymmetry, where one contestant has an advantage over the other by having a better previous performance. Such situations may occur in R&D contests (Harris and Vickers, 1987) , political campaigns (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006) , job promotions (Tsoulouhas, Knoeber and Agrawal, 2007) , and sports competitions (Malueg and Yates, 2010) . This aheadbehind asymmetry creates a discouragement effect, according to which a lagging player has fewer incentives to exert costly efforts and therefore is more likely to lose in the following stages.
1 There is also a psychological explanation according to which ahead-behind asymmetry creates additional psychological pressure on the lagging player, which in turn harms his/her performance and reduces his/her probability of winning (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Genakos and Pagliero, 2012; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Genakos, Pagliero and Garbi, 2015; González-Díaz and PalaciosHuerta, 2016) .
The combination between incentives and ahead-behind asymmetry was studied theoretically by Konrad and Kovenock (2009) . They showed that intermediate prizes in multi-stage contests 1 For example, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) theoretically showed that in sequential elections between two candidates, the loser in the first district had less incentive to exert costly effort in the second district, thereby making it more likely for the winner in the first district to win again. Malueg and Yates (2010) found that the winner of the first set in a tennis match between equally skilled players was more likely to win the second set. Finally, Gill and Prowse (2012) documented the discouragement effect in an experimental sequential tournament by showing that the second mover reacted negatively to the effort of the first mover.
might mitigate the discouragement effect on the lagging player. The intuition behind their result is that a lagging player has more incentive to exert effort in every stage, because the player is competing for an additional prize that can be achieved regardless of the interim gap between the players. In a more recent theoretical study, Fu, Lu and Pan (2015) investigated multi-stage contests, where individuals from two teams compete in pairwise battles. In their model, a team that wins the majority of battles receives a team prize and, additionally, the winner of each pairwise battle receives an individual prize. The authors established the so-called strategic neutrality, according to which the existence of an individual prize eliminates any ahead-behind effect and the probability of winning in every single battle depends only on the players' innate ability and not on the outcome of the past battles.
In general, studying the performance of individuals within a team framework is an important economic and managerial task because in most professions, teamwork is the rule rather than the exception. For example, a recent report by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2014) holds that, in 31 out of 37 sectors, teamwork prevails in over 50% of activities. However, studying the performance of individuals in real-life contests between teams is not a trivial task because reality rarely creates situations that allow a clear view of the contribution of individuals to a team's output. Therefore, the empirical literature is scarce and based mostly on laboratory experiments. 2 A notable exception is the orange grove field experiment conducted by Erev, Bornstein and Galili (1993) , where the authors found that intergroup competition produced a significantly higher output than in the case where subjects were paid 2 For example, in experimental settings Van Dijk, Sonnemans and Van Winden (2001) showed that piece-rate and team payment schemes yield the same efforts, whereas a tournament scheme leads to greater effort. In another experimental study, Dohmen and Falk (2011) found that the output in a team's revenue-sharing scheme was higher than in a fixed-payment structure. For additional references on different aspects in team contests, see the comprehensive review of Sheremeta (2017). according to their individual output or when they received an equal share of the group's total output.
In this paper, we are motivated by the scant empirical evidence from real-life tournaments on the performance of individuals within a team framework, in general, and on the interactive role of incentives and ahead-behind asymmetry in particular. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to test Utilizing data from professional sports where contestants have strong incentives to win has several advantages. First, it eliminates any possible skepticism about applying behavioral insights obtained in a laboratory to real-life situations (Hart, 2005) . Second, sports contests involve high- 3 Obviously, in our analysis we use only matches with undecided ties in which no team won three single matches. See more details in Section 2. 4 It is worth mentioning the paper of Berger and Pope (2011) who showed that basketball teams have a greater probability of winning if they are lagging by a very small margin at half-time.
stake decisions that are familiar to the agents. Third, it provides a unique opportunity to observe and measure performance as a function of variables such as heterogeneity in abilities and prizes.
Fourth, at each point in time, the contestants have complete information about the interim score and the status of the tournament. Indeed, as Kahn (2000) argues, sports data are very unique in that they embody a large amount of detailed information that can be used for research purposes.
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Since being ahead or behind in the interim score is not determined randomly (for example, home teams or stronger tennis nations have a greater probability of being ahead in the interim score), we use several different strategies to disentangle the effect of leading/lagging from the effect of selection. First, we estimate the average treatment effect of leading/lagging by using the distance-weighted radius matching approach with bias adjustments suggested by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2011) . This approach has been shown to have superior finite sample properties relative to a broad range of propensity score-based estimators (Huber, Lechner and Wunsch, 2013) .
Furthermore, it is particularly robust when the propensity score is functionally misspecified. 6 The second strategy is based on a recent study by Oster (2016) that assesses the size of the selection bias and the bias-adjusted treatment effect under the assumption that the relationship between the treatment and the unobservables can be recovered from the relationship between the treatment and the observables. These assessments are made by explicitly linking the size of the bias to the coefficient and the R-squared stability.
5 Numerous studies have used sports data to explain economic behavior. For instance, Walker and Wooders (2001) used tennis matches to test the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium empirically. Palacios-Huerta (2003) tested the Minimax theorem using penalty kicks in professional soccer. Finally, Pope and Schweitzer (2010) provided evidence of loss aversion in professional golf.
Based on the analysis of 2,447 matches from 966 international ties, we find a significant ahead-behind influence on players' performance. More specifically, we find that the favorite (higher ranked player) has about a 4-percentage point greater probability of winning a match if his team is leading. In matches 2 and 4, we find that the effect in match 2 is not significant. However, the effect of being ahead in match 4 is approximately 10 percentage points, which is relatively large. The difference between matches 2 and 4 is likely driven by the rules of the tournament because matches 1 and 2 are played between the first seeded player of one team and the second seeded of another team. In contrast, in match 4, the two top seeded players from each team compete against each other. Thus, unlike in match 4, a lagging favorite competes against a weaker opponent in match 2. Therefore, the discouragement effect is less likely to appear in match 2.
However, the main contribution of this paper is that we have a unique opportunity to study the performance of players in tournaments with and without intermediate prizes. (Krumer, Megidish and Sela, 2017a) and confirmed empirically (Krumer and Lechner, 2017) that the probability of winning depends on the schedule of the round-robin tournament. In addition, Krumer, Megidish and Sela (2017b) showed that winning probabilities of the favorites differ between round-robin and elimination tournaments. Therefore, we concentrate only on the elimination structure used in the World Group, Group 1 and Group 2.
from each team always compete against each other in match 4 and two second seeded players from each team always compete in match 5.
The first team that wins three rubbers wins the tie and progresses to the next round to play a tie against another team. If the tie has not already been decided in favor of one team (no team won three rubbers), then the remaining rubbers are termed live rubbers, which are played in the form of best-of-five sets. Additionally, all dead rubbers are played in the form of best-of-three sets. Finally, between 2009 and 2015 a player who won a single rubber in the World Group received ranking points as long as the rubber was defined as a live rubber. In other years and groups there were no individual prizes for winning a single rubber.
3 Data and variables
Data
As already stated, since there is a difference between the round-robin and elimination formats, our dataset consists of Davis Cup matches in the World Group, Group 1 and Group 2 that use the latter format. In addition, we consider only matches between individuals and do not use matches between doubles because, in most cases, players do not specialize in doubles and play these types of matches only occasionally.
The data were collected from several websites (see Appendix A match. The ranking is used as a measure of the players' abilities and is calculated and updated weekly by taking into account all of the player's results in professional tournaments over the previous 52 weeks. Apart from individual level data, information on the location, group type, year, and tournament round for each tie is also available.
In all, the dataset consists of 4,206 Davis Cup matches. However, we consider only live rubbers (i.e., matches that are still crucial in deciding which team wins the tie) because dead rubbers are in the form of best-of-three sets and usually substitute players compete in these matches. Therefore, 1,198 dead rubber matches were eliminated. In addition, another 561 matches lacked information regarding the current ranking of one of the players, or were not played to completion, and therefore were eliminated as well. 10 Dropping all of these matches leaves 966
Davis Cup ties, consisting of 2,447 matches.
Variables
For each match, we first define the higher ranked player as the favorite and the lower ranked one as the underdog. Then, we estimate the probability that the favorite will win the match.
Accordingly, we assign the dependent variable a value of one if the favorite player won and zero otherwise.
It is important to note that a favorite is lagging if the interim score of the tie before the respective match is 0:1 or 1:2 in favor of the opponent's team. A favorite is leading if the interim score of the tie before the respective match is 1:0 or 2:1 in favor of his team. Therefore, to estimate the effect of being ahead/behind in the score, we coded a dummy variable that equals one if the 10 Out of 561 eliminated matches due to missing information or matches that were not completed, 19 matches were from the World Group, 88 matches were from Group 1 and 454 matches were from Group 2. In 7 matches from the World Group, one of the players did not have World Ranking. The corresponding numbers for Group 1 and Group 2 are 69 and 427 respectively.
favorite is lagging before the respective match and zero otherwise. Similarly, we coded a dummy variable that equals one if the favorite is leading before the respective match and zero otherwise.
The probability of the favorite beating the underdog is obviously a function of their relative strength. We use two different measures in order to control for the relative strength of the two players. The first one, DiffRank, is defined as
, where
FavoriteRank and UnderdogRank are the most current World Rankings of the favorite and the underdog, respectively. The main advantage of this measure is that the differences in the players' quality are not linear but rather grow at an increasing rate as we move up the ranking. Thus, a difference of one position in the ranking list corresponds to a smaller difference in quality if the players are at the bottom of the list, but to a more substantial difference when we compare the top contestants (see also Klaassen and Magnus, 2001) . Table 1 shows that the mean value of this measure is negative owing to the fact that the favorite is associated with a lower ranking number.
The second measure that may provide information about the differences in the abilities of the two players is the difference in head-to-head victories prior to the respective match. Thus, for each match we calculate the number of head-to-head victories in favor of the favorite. This variable, DiffH2H, is measured as the difference between the numbers of matches that the favorite and the underdog won in previous head-to-head matches against each other.
[Insert Table 1 here] We also control for the home advantage, which was found to play a significant role in professional tennis (Koning, 2011) . Thus, the variable that indicates that the favorite has a home advantage gets the value of one if the favorite competes at home and zero otherwise. In addition, we include dummies for each round and type of group categories. Finally, since starting from 2009 a single win in a live rubber of the World Group guaranteed ranking points, we coded a dummy variable that equals one if the match was in the World Group after 2009 and zero otherwise. The descriptive statistics of our dataset are presented in Table 1 . It shows that, on average, the favorite wins in 68.1% of cases if his team is lagging. It also shows that if the favorite's team is leading, his probability of winning is 80.4%. Using a 95% confidence interval, Figure 1 shows that the favorite's share of wins when his team is leading (1:0 or 2:1) is significantly higher than when the interim score is a draw (0:0 or 2:2) or when the favorite's team is lagging (0:1 or 1:2). However, Table 1 also indicates that if the favorite is leading, he also has more of a home advantage, better head-to head performance, and a lower ranking index, which is associated with greater ability.
Thus, in order to obtain the causal effect of being ahead/behind, we will use several estimation strategies that control for selection into treatment (leading/lagging). We discuss these strategies in the following section.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Estimation strategy
Studying whether being ahead or behind before a Davis Cup match gives an advantage to the favorite is a challenging task. A naïve approach of correlating a dummy variable for leading/lagging with the probability to win a match will yield biased and inconsistent estimates because the status of being ahead or behind is not determined at random. Rather, as mentioned earlier, being ahead is a function of features specific to tennis such as home advantage, previous head-to-head meetings, and the difference in abilities between the other members of teams.
Furthermore, isolating an exogenous source of being ahead/behind in the score by using an instrumental variable approach seems unfeasible because any factor that might be associated with being ahead/behind is also likely to affect the probability of winning the match. In the absence of a valid instrument, we will use several alternative strategies to control for the endogeneity of leading or lagging in Davis Cup matches.
Radius matching analysis
As a first step, we derive the radius-matching-on-the-propensity score estimator with bias adjustment (Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2011) . Not only was it found to be very competitive among a range of propensity score related estimators, but also a later paper by Huber, Lechner and Wunsch (2013) actually demonstrated its superior finite sample and robustness properties in a large-scale empirical Monte Carlo study. The main idea of this estimator is to compare treated and non-treated observations within a specific radius. The first step consists of distance-weighted radius matching on the propensity score. In contrast to standard matching algorithms where controls within the radius obtain the same weight independent of their location, in the radius matching approach, controls within the radius are weighted proportionally to the inverse of their distance to the respective treated observations to which they are matched. The second step uses the weights obtained from this matching process in a weighted linear or non-linear regression in order to remove biases due to mismatches. Because this approach uses all comparison observations within a predefined distance around the propensity score, it allows for higher precision than fixed nearest neighbor matching in regions in which many similar comparison observations are available.
Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect
Next, in order to isolate the selection bias and obtain the bias-adjusted treatment effect of leading/lagging, we use a formula suggested by Oster (2016) , which calculates the bias-adjusted treatment effect,   , as follows: 
Results

Basic results
We conducted the analysis for the full dataset. As already discussed, there is a selection into being ahead/behind. Although the purpose of the propensity score estimation is only a technical one, namely, to allow the easy purging of the results from the effects of selection, it is nevertheless interesting to see which variables drive selection. In Table 2 we report the results for the propensity score estimation. We use two different specifications. In the first, we control for differences in rankings, previous head-to-head results and home advantage. In the second specification, we also control for specific features of the ties, such as the round of the tournament, the group, the year and whether the match is a World Group match before or after 2009. We can see that many variables are associated with being ahead/behind. It is not surprising because we would expect home players to be more likely to win and players from stronger countries have, on average, better teammates.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 and Favorite is leading are much higher in the uncontrolled specification presented in Column 3 than in the specification with the full set of controls presented in Column 4.
In Column 5 we present the bias-adjusted treatment effect of lagging/leading. The standard errors obtained from the bootstrap are presented in parentheses. The results show that the estimated causal effect is closer to zero, but still significant. When a favorite is lagging, he is 3.7-percentage points less likely to win with a significance level of 5.3%. The positive effect of being ahead on the favorite's probability of winning is 3.6-percentage points with a significance level of 3.9% .
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It is important to note that our results do not contradict those of Berger and Pope (2011) who found that being slightly behind (one point) at half-time has a positive effect on the probability of winning in basketball. However, being far behind is less likely to have a positive effect. Since in the Davis Cup there are only five matches, being one match behind is a much more significant lag than being one point behind in basketball, where teams score about 100 points per match.
Therefore, we interpret lagging by one match in the Davis Cup as being further rather than slightly behind.
Ahead-behind asymmetry in matches 2 and 4
In this subsection our aim is to investigate only matches where the score is asymmetric, namely matches 2 and 4, where by construction, one team is leading and the other is lagging before the beginning of the match. Figures 2a and 2b show that on average there is a much larger gap between the share of wins if a favorite is leading in match 4 compared to match 2.
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b and Table 4 here] Our empirical analysis presented in Table 4 demonstrates that being ahead has a significant and positive effect on the probability of winning in match 4. We find no significant effect of being ahead in match 2.
12 This result is in line with several explanations. First, as already mentioned, matches 1 and 2 are played between the first seeded player of one team and the second seeded of 11 Note that in the case of lagging, our treatment is being behind compared to being ahead or even. Similarly, in the case of leading, our treatment is being ahead compared to being behind or even.
12 In Appendix C we show that the effect of leading in match 4 is significantly higher than in match 2.
another team, whereas match 4 involves the two top seeded players from each team. Thus, by construction, a lagging favorite competes against a weaker opponent in match 2 compared to match 4. Therefore, the discouragement effect is less likely to appear in match 2.
There are some additional explanations for the difference in results between matches 2 and 4. For example, it is possible that a lagging player has much more to lose in terms of a team prize in match 4 compared to match 2 because if a lagging player loses in match 4, his team loses the entire tie. Therefore, such a situation may provoke choking under pressure of the lagging player and, as a result, harm his performance and reduce the likelihood of his winning. 13 Finally, it is also possible that the leading player values his win more than the lagging player in match 4 compared to match 2, which may also result in a difference in the probabilities of winning. This difference in valuations between the matches may be driven by simple egocentric motives. For example, the winner of the match that determines the tie gets more glory. This explanation was put forward when the Portuguese soccer super star, Christiano Ronaldo, decided to take the last penalty kick in the semifinal match of the UEFA European Championships in 2012 in the anticipation that it would be the one to finish off Spain and send Portugal to the Euro 2012 final.
14 Although we cannot observe all of the possible prizes the players receive from winning a single match, in the next subsection we use a unique opportunity to study the effect of the aheadbehind asymmetry in settings with and without intermediate prizes.
13 See Ariely et al. (2009) who showed that large stakes might reduce performance. Additionally, Paserman (2010) found that the performance of tennis players deteriorates on more important points. Similarly, documented that professional male tennis players lose more serves when the pressure is higher.
The effect of ranking points introduced in the World Group in 2009
In this subsection, we take advantage of the change in the rules introduced by the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP). Up to 2009, players did not receive any ranking points for a single win. However, between 2009 and 2015, the winner of a live rubber of the World Group received ranking points. These points are taken into account in determining the World Ranking list. This list is very important because it determines the entries to the most important tournaments with the highest monetary rewards. It also determines the identity of the seeded players in other tournaments. These seeded players benefit from a better draw, because in the first rounds they play against non-seeded players who are, on average, weaker than the seeded ones. To put this decision into perspective, a win in a main tournament of the Davis Cup was worth 40-75 ranking points, depending on the round. This means that two wins in Davis Cup matches were worth more than two wins in the first two rounds of Grand Slam tournaments (55 points), which are the most prestigious tennis tournaments.
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As discussed, the intermediate prizes (ranking points) theoretically play a very important role in multi-stage contests. According to Konrad and Kovenock (2009) , the introduction of positive intermediate prizes may increase the lagging player's probability of winning. Moreover, according to Fu, Lu and Pan (2015) , if there is an intermediate prize, which is common to both players, the interim score of a tie has no effect on the players' probability of winning in a single rubber. This probability depends only on the players' innate abilities. starting from 2009, the probability of winning is affected by the state of the contest (whether a player is leading or lagging).
Indeed, based on the World Group ties, Figure 3a shows that the gap between the probabilities of winning when one is leading in match 4 compared to being behind was on average 28-percentage points before the change in the rules in 2009. 16 This gap however, was dramatically reduced to only 8-percentage points after 2009, as shown in Figure 3b .
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b here]
One possible concern, however, is that the introduction of the ranking points may attract better players. Therefore, the greater probability of the lagging favorite may be attributed to selection rather than to intermediate prizes.
To obviate this concern and show that the players' rankings were not differently distributed before and after 2009, we used the following two-step procedure. First, we partitioned the data into two parts, where one set contains the World Groups' match 4 before 2009 and the other the World Groups' match 4 after 2009. In Table 5 we report the average value of the log2 of the ranking of the favorite, the underdog and the differences between them on the match level, separately for each period. In parentheses we present their standard deviations. Column 1 refers to the matches before 2009, while Column 2 refers to the matches after 2009. We can see that the log2 of the players' rankings is even somewhat higher after 2009, implying rankings of those with less ability. Then, we run a set of univariate regressions of each of the variables presented in Table 5 on a dummy variable indicating whether the specific observation was before 2009. The coefficient of this dummy variable and its standard error are presented in Column 3. The results show that none of these players' characteristics differ 16 As previously, no significant differences between winning probabilities were observed in match 2. The results are available upon request.
significantly between the two periods, which indicates that the players' log2 of rankings and their differences do not differ before and after 2009, and thus selection into the sample is not a concern.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
In Table 6 , we present the effects of leading in match 4 on the probability of the favorite player winning before and after 2009. The radius-matching estimator presented in Column 1 implies that there is a significant and positive effect of being ahead before 2009, which is much smaller and not significant after 2009.
In Columns 2 and 3 we report the results of the linear probability model (LPM), where robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Since there is a very small number of observations, the R-squared is very sensitive to the inclusion of any additional variable. Therefore, we follow
Oster (2016) who also offers an adjusted procedure for evaluating the bias-adjusted treatment effect when some variables are considered part of the identification strategy and thus appear both in the controlled and uncontrolled regressions. The idea is to assess the amount of selection on the observables conditional on including these variables in the estimation. Because some of the variables were significant in the propensity score estimation presented in Appendix D, it is worthwhile assessing the amount of selection conditional on these variables being included in the estimation as part of our identification strategy. Therefore, in Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A in Table   6 , which represents the matches before 2009, the DiffRank and Year2008 are included both in the controlled and uncontrolled regressions. Similarly, since DiffRank was significant in the propensity score estimation (Column 2 in Appendix D), in Panel B of Table 6 , DiffRank is included both in the controlled and uncontrolled regressions (Columns 2 and 3).
We can see that the coefficients are significant before 2009 and even higher when including the controls (Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A in Table 6 ). Therefore, by definition, Oster's bias-adjusted coefficient has to be even further from zero, as we can see in Column 4 of Panel A in Table 6 . However, the bootstrapping procedure in the dataset that includes 89 observations only increases the standard errors and the p-val to 0.125. Nevertheless, the most important result in this case is that Oster's bias-adjusted coefficient becomes even larger compared to the LPM. When testing the effect of leading after 2009, we can see that according to all of the estimators (Columns 2-4 of Panel B in Table 6 ) the effect of leading in match 4 is much closer to zero and highly insignificant.
Finally, we test whether the intermediate prizes increase the probability of the lagging player to win, as indicated in Figures 3a and 3b . In Table 7 , we compare the winning probabilities of the lagging favorites in match 4 before and after 2009. In total, we have 45 such cases before 2009 and 43 after. The radius-matching estimator presented in Column 1 implies that the effect of the intermediate prizes on the probability of the lagging favorite winning is 18.4 percentage points with a significance level of 6%. It is important to note that similar to the results presented in Table   5 , in the case with the lagging favorite as well, none of the characteristics significantly differs between the two periods, before and after 2009. In fact, as shown in Appendix E, none of the variables has a p-value lower than 0.31. This result serves as additional evidence that selection into the sample is not a concern.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Finally, in order to conduct Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect, we use the results of the LPM with and without the full set of controls as presented in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. We can see that the effect of the post-2009 period is not sensitive to the inclusion of the controls. Its size is about 20 percentage points with a significance level of 3.6% and 4.7% in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Not surprisingly, Oster's bias-adjusted coefficient, presented in Column 4 is almost the same as in the LPM, with a significance level of 5.6%.
These results suggest that the introduction of incentives for winning a single match is likely to affect the performance of players. Although our empirical settings do not fully match the theoretical settings of Fu, Lu and Pan (2015) and Konrad and Kovenock (2009) , our finding that the probability of winning is not affected by the state of the contest when an intermediate prize is
introduced is in line with these theoretical predictions. In general, our empirical results emphasize the importance of the strategic allocation of efforts in multi-stage contests that is well known in the theoretical literature. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of some other psychological effects, our findings suggest that the introduction of intermediate prizes may mitigate or even eliminate the ahead-behind effects that arise in multi-stage contests.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we used a real-life tournament setting to test the effect of ahead-behind asymmetry on individuals' performance in multi-stage contests between teams with and without intermediate prizes.
As in previous studies, we find that being ahead provides players with a greater probability of success. However, the main contribution of this paper is that it empirically shows that intermediate prizes eliminate the usual ahead-behind effect that may arise from psychological as well as from strategic considerations.
Our results, obtained from real-life contests, underscore the role of strategic motives in individual performance. This is especially important on the team level, because teamwork is 17 See Cohen-Zada, Krumer and Shtudiner (2017) for a discussion about the coexistence of psychological and strategic motives in multi-stage contests.
probably the most prevalent form of economic activity. Our findings suggest that non-monetary incentives alone, such as a team's pride, are probably not enough to maximize a player's output.
This result may be of great importance in situations that involve a choice between individual and social benefits.
Furthermore, individual incentives may improve the utility of other teammates of the lagging team because such incentives do not affect the winning probabilities of leading favorites, who are likely to win the decisive match regardless of the incentives. It is rather the lagging favorite who benefits from additional individual reward, as well as his teammates, who benefit from the greater probability of winning the entire contest. This may explain why companies in difficulty are ready to pay extra salaries to high-profile workers, who are able to stabilize the firm's cash flows or profits. However, other workers who do not receive an additional individual reward may also benefit from the increased stability of their workplace.
Finally, it is important to note that despite the fact that our findings are in line with the common ahead-behind effects and with previous theoretical studies on the effect of intermediate prizes, the results of this paper were obtained from the sport of tennis, which is mostly an individual sport. Playing in teams in the Davis Cup is not the usual competitive format for most players. Therefore, it is possible that our results would be different in other settings, where agents are used to performing in teams. It is also possible that those who are not used to large monetary rewards would also behave differently. Note: Logit average marginal effects are presented. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite is lagging. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite is leading. Clustered standard errors at the tie level are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
The dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite wins in the respective match. In Columns 1 and 2 the radius matching average effects of lagging/leading on the winning probability of a favorite are presented.
The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A are based on the propensity score estimation presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 respectively. The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B are based on the propensity score estimation presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 respectively. Clustered standard errors at the tie level are presented in parentheses. For these columns we also present the number of observations in common support. The list of basic controls includes the difference in ranking indexes between a favorite and an underdog, whether a favorite has a home advantage, and the difference in the previous head to head results as presented in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 . The full specification is presented in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 . In Columns 3 and 4 the coefficients from the LPM are presented. Standard errors clustered at the tie level are presented in parentheses.
In Column 5 we report Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect when the amount of selection on unobservables is recovered from the amount of selection on all observables. Standard errors in Column 5 are obtained from bootstrapping (499 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite wins in the respective match. In Columns 1 and 2 the radius matching average effects of leading on the winning probability of a favorite are presented. The results in Columns 1 and 2 are based on the propensity score estimation presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table B .1 respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. For these columns we also present the number of observations in common support.
In Columns 3 and 4 we report Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect when the amount of selection on unobservables is recovered from the amount of selection on all observables based on same specifications as in Table 3 . Standard errors in these columns are obtained from bootstrapping (499 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. The dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite who was lagging before match 4 wins in the respective match. In Column 1 the radius matching average effect of the post-2009 period on the winning probability of a favorite is presented. This result is based on the propensity score estimation presented in Appendix E, where we use the full specification. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. For Column 1 we also present the number of observations in common support. In Columns 2 and 3 the coefficients from the LPM are presented. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
In Column 4 we report Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect when the amount of selection on unobservables is recovered from the amount of selection on all observables. Standard errors in Column 4 are obtained from bootstrapping (499 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Figure 1: Share of wins as a function of the status of the match
Notes: This figure presents the means of the share of wins of a favorite at different statuses based on all data. 95% confidence interval is presented. Note: Logit average marginal effects are presented. The dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite is leading in the respective match. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Appendix C: Comparison between the effects of leading The dependent variable is a dummy of whether a favorite wins in the respective match. In Column 1 we present the results of the LPM controlling for main effects only (a dummy of whether a favorite is leading and a dummy of whether a match is match 4 or not (match 2)). In Column 2 we use our full set of controls as presented in Column 4 of Table 2 . Clustered standard errors at the tie level are presented in parentheses.
In Column 3 we report Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect. We treat the main effects as part of the identification strategy and thus recover the amount of selection on unobservables from the amount of selection on all of the other observed characteristics, where the main effects are included both in the uncontrolled and controlled regressions presented in Columns 1 and 2 respectively. Standard errors are obtained from bootstrapping (499 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Appendix D: Propensity score estimation for match 4 
